"You won't believe how much money we spent in the last two hours."

    — A White House official, speaking anonymously to Congress Daily,
shortly before the House vote on renewing Fast Track.

The year 2001 was, to say the least, a tumultuous year for the
opponents of corporate-led globalization. There were many high points,
such as the gathering of over 10,000 people from across the world in
Porto Alegre, Brazil to discuss positive alternatives to corporate-led
globalization. Then, there were the 60,000 people moved to take to the
streets in Quebec City, Canada to protest the creation of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). At the same time, even before the
horrendous tragedies of September 11, there were extreme lows, the
worst being the deaths of four anti-globalization protestors at the
hands of police on the streets of Genoa, Italy and Papua New Guinea.

However, it was clear throughout the year that the anti-globalization
movement had fundamentally shifted the debate on globalization from one
of "how fast?" to "for whom and at what cost?" Just as this shift in
thinking had begun to affect the shape of public policy, the tragedy of
September 11 occurred. Nothing could have prepared the
anti-globalization movement—or anyone—for the events of September 11
and their aftermath. But neither could we have foreseen the sort of
dirty politics carried out in the name of fighting terrorism that would
be used by the Bush administration and the Republican leadership to
achieve its 2001 corporate globalization "victories:" the launch of a
new round of negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
passage of Fast Track in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Immediately following the events of September 11, the Bush
administration began to argue that terrorism could be fought with
trade. The first step would be Fast Track—the darling of the corporate
world, denied to it for seven years by a coalition of legislators and
human rights, women's, environmental, consumer, and labor
organizations. "Fast Track" is a mechanism by which Congress eliminates
many of the key democratic processes it uses to create
legislation—including the full committee process, full debate, and the
ability to amend legislation. Opposition to Fast Track has grown
steadily in and outside of Congress primarily in response to the
legislation that it has been used to pass—most recently, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the establishment of the WTO.
After experiencing the impact of these agreements, few in the United
States were eager to so readily turn over their democratic rights to
aid in the creation of such legislation in the future. So, when
President Bush and his trade representative, Robert Zoellick, started
emphasizing Fast Track as a response to terrorism, few thought the
argument would go far. In fact, the legislation remained stalled until
the success of the fourth WTO ministerial meeting held in the small
dictatorship of Doha, Qatar in the Persian Gulf.
Erasing the "Stain of Seattle"

In December 1999, the WTO tried to hold its third ministerial meeting
in Seattle, Washington. The WTO was unable to launch a new round of
trade liberalization negotiations at this meeting because of the 50,000
people on the streets of Seattle who brought sunshine to a
traditionally secret backroom process. The sunshine made it impossible
for the WTO delegates do the arm-twisting and undemocratic deals for
which the organization is renowned. Even more importantly, developing
country delegates stood up to the "Quad"—the United States, European
Union, Japan, and Canada—to reject the launch of a new round of
negotiations.

By 2001, the WTO, and the United States and European Union in
particular, had learned their lesson. First, the location chosen for
the ministerial meeting was Doha, Qatar, a remote dictatorship where
entry was controlled and protest illegal. Not only was it difficult for
WTO-critics to get in to the country (only about sixty did), but it was
also difficult for both the mainstream and alternative media to cover
the event. The distance effectively blocked out the sunshine and gave
negotiators the ability to wheel, deal, and arm-twist like never
before.

Developing country delegates entered this ministerial virtually united
in a set of demands consisting largely of reforms to existing WTO
rules. They were united in their opposition to the launch of a new
round and to the addition of new issues to the WTO's already biased
agenda. Also united were hundreds of citizens' groups from around the
world who had signed a WTO "shrink or sink" statement demanding the WTO
not only reject new issues and the launch of a new round, but that it
also "shrink" its current set of rules or "sink" as an organization all
together. Once in Doha, however, all of these demands were quickly
rejected and the unity of the developing country delegates was
systematically destroyed.

Two weeks before the Doha ministerial began, U.S. Trade Representative
Zoellick set the tone by saying, "as much as developing countries may
need debt relief and development aid, a prerequisite for their
long-term economic growth is full participation with the global economy
and trading system. Doha is the best opportunity we will have in the
next ten to fifteen years to expedite this integration. It is an
opportunity neither we nor the developing world can afford to miss"
(International Trade Daily, October 31, 2001). The not so hidden
threat?—play ball in Doha or your debt relief and development aid will
be cut off. This threat was spoken bluntly time and time again to
developing country delegates in backrooms throughout Doha.

For example, according to Walden Bello, Executive Director of Focus on
the Global South, Haiti and the Dominican Republic were told by the
United States to cease opposition to one of the proposed new
issues—government procurement—or risk cancellation of their
preferential trade arrangements. Bello also describes how Pakistan,
typically a stalwart among developing countries against the WTO, was
mostly quiet in Doha after receiving a massive aid package of grants,
loans, and debt reduction from the United States due to its special
status in the U.S. war on terrorism. Also, Nigeria, which had issued an
official communiqué denouncing the draft WTO declaration before Doha,
came out loudly supporting it on November 14—a flip-flop that,
according to Bello, is difficult to separate from the fact that the
United States came up with the promise of a big economic and military
aid package in the interim.

A Joint Motion for Resolution offered after the ministerial by members
of the European Parliament states their opposition to the "heavy-handed
and divisive tactics used by the WTO Secretariat, the EU, and the USA"
in Doha.

Even more troubling to U.S. citizens may be how Zoellick abandoned
promises he had made to senior United States senators such as John D.
Rockefeller, Democrat from West Virginia. According to the senator, Mr.
Zoellick "promised me, facing me, looking directly in my eye, in my
office, that he would not in any way compromise various fair trade and
anti-dumping laws, [and] he immediately did so within the first five
minutes" of arriving in Doha (The Washington Post, December 17, 2001).
Zoellick also chose to simply ignore Congress' unambiguous statutory
requirement that he seek a labor working group at the WTO.

The dirty politics worked: developing countries, isolated from
information and support and in fragile positions due to the war on
terrorism and the global recession, were brought to their knees;
citizens groups were denied their numbers, access, and therefore much
of their influence, and the launch of a new round was won. Upon
departing Doha, Zoellick announced, "we have overcome the stain of
Seattle" (International Trade Daily, November 15, 2001).

These dirty politics, however, look pristine in comparison to what came
next—the vote on Fast Track. Fresh from his victory in Doha, Zoellick
was prepared to do anything to complete his success by winning Fast
Track.
The Fast Track Vote

On December 6, 2001, less than a month after the Doha ministerial, Fast
Track was defeated in the U.S. House of Representatives. It had lost by
four votes when the official time expired. Unfortunately, this is not
the end of the story. Not to be undone by the rules, Robert Zoellick
and the Republican leadership used their control of the House floor to
keep the Fast Track vote open an unprecedented twenty-three minutes
after the official clock expired. When they achieved a one vote
majority, they slammed down the gavel: stopping the clock on the vote,
eliminating the ability of the other side to respond, and eking out a
215 to 214 victory. Fast Track passed in the House.

In that twenty-three minutes, Republicans were searching for votes and
found James DeMint, Republican of South Carolina waiting for them with
a letter in his hand. The letter committed its signers (soon to include
House speaker Dennis Hastert; Dick Armey, the majority leader; and Tom
DeLay, the majority whip) to use "whatever means necessary" to cancel
some textile export preferences already granted by Congress to
Caribbean, Central American, and Andean nations in the Caribbean Basin
Trade Preferences Act—effectively gutting a central provision of the
Act—as well as directly contradicting pledges made by the United States
in Doha to consider speeding the elimination of barriers to textile
trade. With Democrats shouting to end the voting and declare defeat,
DeMint and the House leaders engaged in animated discussions on the
floor before DeMint got his letter signed. DeMint, who had voted no,
then switched in his vote to yes. Then, according to DeMint, he "went
and got a few other textile folks who were going the other way, and got
them to vote for it. We passed it" (Los Angeles Times, December 2).

The tactics in Doha and Washington revealed the Bush Administration and
House Republicans willingness to do anything to get their globalization
agenda passed. To get a deal signed in Doha, they reneged on promises
made to members of their own government and commitments required of
them under U.S. law. To get a deal signed in Washington, they made the
entire U.S. Congress renege on trade commitments made to some of the
poorest countries in the world in an earlier trade agreement. Also in
Washington, they reneged on commitments made in Doha to developing
countries just weeks before. According to the conservative Financial
Times, "the House vote [on Fast Track] casts doubt on Washington's
reliability as a partner."
What it All Means

If it becomes law, Fast Track will allow the Bush administration to
move any agreements reached in the WTO's new negotiating round (as well
as the FTAA and any other new trade deals) through Congress more
easily. Included in the WTO negotiations (scheduled to conclude in
2005) are agreements—known as the "new issues"—desperately sought by
multinational corporations in the areas of investment, government
procurement, competition policy, and trade facilitation. Also included
in the negotiations are "built-in" items such as services and
agriculture. Similar agreements are included in the proposed FTAA. Both
the new and built-in negotiations seek, through various channels, to
allow multinational corporations greater access to markets—including
many traditionally associated with governments—such as the provision of
water, electricity, elementary and secondary education, libraries,
waste disposal, etc.—while simultaneously restricting the ability of
governments to regulate corporate behavior in these areas. In other
words, the agreements force the United States, and all signatories, to
move towards the privatization of these vital services without a single
public discussion. The impact on the United States is the same as
around the world—less government control, more corporate control, less
accountability to citizens and their needs that run afoul of the profit
motive.

At the writing of this article, Fast Track has not yet been passed. It
must first go through the Senate and then most likely back to the House
for a final vote. In addition, neither the FTAA nor any of the
agreements being negotiated at the WTO are done deals (the next WTO
ministerial meeting is scheduled for Mexico in 2003). We have the power
to decide whether or not they come to be. Several pundits have already
begun to argue that the dirty politics of the Doha ministerial and the
vote on Fast Track could cost the Republicans their majority in
Congress and their hold on the White House. Maybe it should.

Antonia Juhasz is the project director of the International Forum on
Globalization (www.ifg.org).